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LABOR LAW-THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'S JURIS­
DICTIONAL POWER OVER HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES IN SHEL­
TERED WORKSHOPS 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Labor Relations Act l (NLRA) facilitates the free 
flow of interstate commerce by regulating employer-employee rela­
tionships.2 Although the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations 
Board (Board) must be broad in order to carry out the purpose of the 
NLRA,3 the Board's jurisdiction is limited to "employers"4 and "em­
ployees."5 Because the NLRA defines these terms very broadly,6 the 
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) (original version at ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1935». 
2. Congress found that employers who denied their employees the right to organize 
and to bargain collectively forced employees to strike, which led to industrial strife and 
burdened and obstructed commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Congress determined that 
protecting employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively safeguarded the consis­
tency and flow of commerce. [d. Congress set out to eliminate and mitigate obstructions 
and causes of obstructions of commerce. [d. 
3. Congress specifically decided to allow the Board to have broad jurisdiction in or­
der to effectuate the policies of the Act. The House of Representatives stated that 
the power of the Board under the ... act in the matter of unfair labor practices is 
exclusive. . . . The rule of exclusive jurisdiction was developed many years ago 
. . . to provide for uniformity in matters of national policy under the commerce 
clause. 
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 292, 331 (1974). Furthermore, the Sen­
ate indicated that "[the NLRA] has demonstrated that ... [due to] lengthy hearings and 
litigation enforcing its orders, the Board has not been able . . . to correct unfair labor 
practices until after substantial injury has been done." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 27, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
ACT, 1947 at 407,433 (1974). See infra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the broad discretion exercised by the Board. 
4.. The term "e!llployer" is defined as including 
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not 
include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any 
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any corpo­
ration or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net ellrnings inures to 
the benefit of any private shareholder, or individual, or any person subject to the 
Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.c. §§ 151-163, 18'1-188], as'amended from time to 
time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or any­
one acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization. 
29 U.S.C: § 152(2) (1982). See infranote 56 and accompanying text for a further discus­
sion of the definition of "employer" under the NLRA. 
5. The term "employee" is defined as including 
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Board and court interpretations have become important in determin­
ing whether the Board has jurisdiction in a particular instance. 7 These 
interpretations, however, are somewhat limited to the ordinary mean­
ing of the terms. 8 One area of debate arises when courts consider 
whether handicapped workers employed in "sheltered workshops"9 
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, 
unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual 
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current 
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained 
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include 
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of 
any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or 
spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any 
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer 
subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188], as amended 
from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein 
defined. 
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). See infra note 55 and accompanying text for a further discus­
sion of the definition of "employee" under the NLRA. 
6. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text for the definitions of "employee" and 
"employer" under the NLRA. See also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 
(1944) (the broad language of NLRA definitions indicate that applicability is to be broadly 
determined). See infra note 7 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the court's 
interpretation of the broad language of the NLRA. 
7. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). The Supreme Court 
stated 	that 
the broad language of the Act's definitions, which ... reject conventional limita­
tions on such conceptions as "employee," "employer," and "labor dispute," 
leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly ... by underly­
ing economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously estab­
lished legal classifications. 
It is not necessary ... to make a completely definitive limitation around the 
term "employee." That task has been assigned primarily to the [Board] .... 
Id. at 129-30. See also NLRB v: Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 693 (1980); Allied 
Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
Chemical Division, 404 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1971). See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying 
text for a further discussion of the definitions of "employee" and "employer" under the 
NLRA. 
8. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947). The House of Representa­
tives stated that: 
An "employee," according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as 
the courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone, 
... means someone who works for another for hire .... It is inconceivable that 
Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to give to every word in 
the act whatever meaning it wished . . . . Congress intended ... that the Board 
give to the words not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings. 
Id. See also Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union 1 v. Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co., Chemical Division, 404 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1971). . 
9. A "sheltered workshop" is defined by the Department of Labor as "a charitable 
organization or institution conducted not for profit, but for the purpose of carrying out a 
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constitute "employees," or whether the management of these work­
shops constitute "employers" within the meaning of the National La­
bor Relations Act. 10 Such a determination is neither simple nor 
straightforward. The ultimate solution involves balancing many com­
peting policies involving labor as a whole and handicapped individuals 
as a protected group. Decisions have been made on an ad hoc!! basis. 
Thus, decisions and determinations have not provided a stable and 
consistent basis for future determinations. At best, these decisions 
provide only a few vague tests to be used when considering this issue. 
As a result, sheltered workshop employers and their handicapped em­
ployees have no guidelines by which to gauge their conduct within the 
employer-employee relationship. 
The NLRA's broad language, along with the extensive jurisdic­
tional power vested in the Board, provide few guidelines for determin­
ing which individuals and/or corporations fall within the provisions of 
the Act.!2 Thus, jurisdiction over appropriate groups is based on a 
recognized program of rehabilitation for handicapped workers, and/or providing such indi­
viduals with renumerative employment or other occupational rehabilitating activity of an 
educational or therapeutic nature." Employment of Handicapped Clients in Sheltered 
Workshops, 29 C.F.R. § 525.2(b) (1988). See infra note 57 and accompanying text for a 
further discussion of the Department of Labor's definition of "sheltered workshop." 
10. See Sheltered Workshops of San Diego, 126 N.L.R.B. 961 (1960). Sheltered 
Workshops of San Diego, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation providing work experience for 
physically, mentally, emotionally, and socially disabled persons. Id. The workers are paid 
an hourly wage regardless of their production, and many are only part-time employees. Id. 
Revenues are derived from sales to profit-making firms, fees for public services for the 
handicapped, and donations. Id. San Diego is a certified sheltered workshop, exempt from 
minimum wage requirements, and not subject to unemployment compensation laws. Id. 
The Board determined that regardless of similarities to an employment relationship, the 
emphasis on training, counseling, rehabilitation, and placement tend to establish therapeu­
tic assistance rather than employment. Id. Therefore, the Board decided that it was not 
necessary to determine whether or not the workshop was an employer under the Act. Id. 
The Board viewed the commercial activities as simply a means to an end. Id. See also 
Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976) (it effectuated the policies of 
the Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction over this employer engaged in the non-retail 
performance of services). See infra notes 136-83 and accompanying text for a further dis­
cussion of the court's.view of whether handicapped employees in sheltered workshops fall 
under the Board's jurisdiction. 
11. "Ad hoc" is defined as "[fjor this; for this special purpose." BLACK'S LAW DIC­
TIONARY 38 (5th ed. 1979). More broadly it is defined as "made, established, acting, or 
concerned with a particular end or purpose." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 26 (1971). In common legal usage, the term is used to distinguish those deci­
sions which are, because of their very nature, decided on a case-by-case basis rather than 
establishing precise legal guidelines for application in future cases. 
12. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the indi­
viduals who fall within the Board's jurisdiction. 
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case-by-case inquiry.13 This type of inquiry does not always include 
careful consideration of other legislation, policies, or problems which 
should be considered in dealing with certain individuals. 14 The handi­
capped are a prime example of this situation. Although the language 
of the NLRA does not specifically exclude such individuals and their 
employers from the Board's jurisdiction, other legislation, policies, 
and problems must be considered when the Board makes its determi­
nation on the appropriate measures to be taken. In order to effectuate 
the policies and purposes of the NLRA, while also furthering the poli­
cies and purposes of legislation directed toward handicapped employ­
ees, a modified approach must be taken. 
Part I of this comment describes the history and development of 
the NLRA. Part II then discusses legislation enacted to protect ;md 
provide employment and educational assistance to handicapped indi­
viduals; it also examines the policies and purposes behind this legisla­
tion. Part III reviews and discusses cases arising under the 
jurisdiction of the Board, within the setting of a "sheltered workshop" 
that employs handicapped individuals. Part IV examines the most re­
cent case in the area of handicapped employees in a sheltered work­
shop, Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB.15 Part V compares 
and contrasts the· reasoning behi~d the court decisions based upon the 
legislation and policies in the area, pointing out the consistencies and 
inconsistencies in court r~asoning and conclusions. 
Before examining the consistencies and inconsistencies in legisla­
tion and case law, this comment first turns to an examination of the 
NLRA. An overview of this statute is instrumental in understanding 
the role that the Board can and should play in the regulation of shel­
tered workshops employing handicapped individuals. 




Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act17 in 1935. 
The National Labor Board, now the National Labor Relations Board, 
13. See infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text for a further discussion of case-by­
case determinations made by the Board. 
14. See infra notes 58-136 and accompanying text for further discussion ofiegislation 
enacted pertaining to handicapped individuals. 
15. 851 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988). 
16. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)). 
17. Id. 
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was organized under the National Industrial Relief Act lS by Public 
Resolution 44.19 Although the Board had the power and machinery to 
conduct union elections, it could only report unfair labor violations to 
the National Relief Administrator2o or the Department of Justice for 
prosecution.21 Thus, in dealing with recalcitrant employers, the Board 
came up against a legal stone wall created by a lack of legal compul­
sion to comply with the Board's decision. 22 The Board's findings were 
18. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). Congress passed 
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933, nicknamed Labor's Magna Charta, 
as a temporary measure in response to widespread unemployment and disorganization of 
industry. J. ROSENFARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND How IT WORKS 13 (1940). 
The Act authorized the President to establish agencies to effectuate the functions of the 
Act. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 195 (1933). Section 7(a) of 
the NIRA required that every code of unfair labor competition, agreement, or license ap­
proved or issued under the National Industrial Recovery Act state employees' rights to 
unionize and to choose whether or not they wished to belong to a union. National Indus­
trial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933). On May 27, 1935, the United 
States Supreme Court declared the NIRA to be unconstitutional. A.L.A. Schechter Poul­
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
19. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74thCong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1935). Public Resolution 44 was a 
temporary measure taken by Congress in response to the failure of the proposed National 
Labor Relations Act to reach the floor of Congress for a vote. Id. Under the Resolution, 
Congress authorized the President to establish one or more boards to investigate labor 
disputes. National Industrial Recovery Board Establishment, ch. 677,48 Stat. 1183 (1934). 
The board(s) were empowered to order and conduct union elections to ensure employees' 
rights to organize and select representatives for collective bargaining. Id. In union elec­
tions, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals had the right to review the orders of the 
board(s). Id. The resolution was to be in effect until June 16, 1935. Id. 
20. On August 5, 1933, the President created the National Labor Board in accord­
ance with his powers under NIRA. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 
(1933). The Board, consisting of 20 regional boards, had jurisdiction only over cases in­
volving violations of section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act. R. SMITH, L. 
MERRIFIELD, & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 34 (5th ed. 1974). 
In response to employers questioning the Board's authority, the President issued a 
series of executive orders giving the Board the right to adjust certain industrial disputes, 
conduct elections, and publish names of representatives; in addition, he ratified the previous· 
actions of the Board. Id. This Board ceased to exist on July 9, 1934. Id. 
21. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1935). in describing the problems 
encountered by the Board prior to the enactment of the NLRA, the House of Representa­
tives stated: 
All that the National Labor Board could do, if it found a violation ... was to 
report the case to the National Recovery Administration, which might take away 
the employer's "blue eagle", or to the Department of Justice, which was author­
ized to institute, de novo, proceedings in equity or criminal prosecution, under 
subsections (c) and (f) of section 3. 
Id. at 2. 
22. Id. at 3-4. The House of Representatives described the situation as follows: 
When a complaint is made to the board of violation ... evidence is heard and 
transcribed by the proper regional board established by the National Labor Rela­
tions Board. The board has no power to subpoena witnesses or administer oaths. 
If the employer chooses to ignore the hearing, he can do so with impunity. . .. If 
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given no prima facie weight by the courts in subsequent proceedings, 
thereby forcing the Department of Justice to start all investigations 
and proceedings anew.23 Serious conflicts between employees and em­
ployers continued to burden, or threaten to burden, the free flow of 
commerce and also produced enormous losses in wages, trade, and 
commerce.24 
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA which gave the Board the 
power to investigate violations, make orders in response to any viola­
tions, and apply to the court of appeals to enforce such orders.25 The 
extent of the Board's power was to be equal to that of congressional 
powers under the commerce clause.26 Thus, Congress enacted the 
the regional board finds a violation ... and the employer fails to comply with its 
recommendation for appropriate restitution, the case is referred to the National 
Labor Relations Board, which reviews the record. . .. If the [NLRB] confirms 
the finding of violation it publishes its finding[ s] ... and announces that unless the 
employer in default makes proper restitution it will refer the case to ... National 
Recovery Administration, and to other agencies of the Government. 
[T]here is no legal compulsion upon the employer to comply. . .. Assuming 
[upon transmission] the National Recovery Administration decides to remove the 
Blue Eagle, compliance is by no means assured. The nature of the business may 
be such that the deprivation of the Blue Eagle has only a negligible effect, in 
which case the employer may still ignore the decision. If ... the National Recov­
ery Administrator insignia is of substantial value ... [the employer] may apply to 
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for an injunction restraining the 
National Recovery Administration from acting to deprive him of the right to 
display such an insignia. These injunction suits are becoming almost routine. 
Id. 
23. Id. at 4. The House of Representatives stated: 
When the Board refers a case to the Department of Justice ... the record made 
up by the Board goes for naught, and weeks or more after the alleged violation 
the Department must prepare the case for the court, de novo. The Department 
does not go into court on the record before the Board to enforce the decision of 
the Board; indeed the Board's findings of fact have not even prima facie weight in 
subsequent proceedings. . .. [T]he Department in many cases finds it necessary 
to make extensive investigations before instituting legal proceedings. 
Id. 
24. Id. at 6-7. The House of Representatives stated: 
In brief, such obstructions and burdens occur because of the stoppage of the flow 
of goods from and into the channels of such commerce, because of the effect on 
related or independent industries or establishments, and because of cessation of 
employment and wages, sometimes prostrating whole communities or otherwise 
impairing such commerce .... 
Throughout the period of the operation of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act, there existed or were impending serious conflicts burdening or threatening to 
burden the free flow of commerce in some of our largest industries .... 
Id. at 6. 
25. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449. 
26. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935). "In enacting the National 
Labor Relations Act, Congress gave and intended to give the Board the fullest possible 
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NLRA to promote equality in bargaining power between employees 
and employers, to diminish the causes of labor disputes, and to create 
the National Labor Relations Board.27 The NLRA declares that the 
United States' policy is to mitigate and eliminate the causes of substan­
tial obstructions to interstate commerce.28 This national policy is to 
be achieved, among other courses of action, by encouraging the prac­
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting employee 
freedom of association, self-organization, and the designation of em­
ployee choices for representatives. 29 These representatives are to ne­
gotiate the terms and conditions of employment as well as negotiate 
for other mutual aid and/or protection.30 Generally, the act sought 
"to make the appropriate collective action (of employees) an instru­
ment of peace rather than strife. "31 The Board's jurisdiction is limited 
jurisdiction under the commerce clause of the Constitution." NLRB v. Erlich's 814, Inc., 
577 F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1978). See also NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 
(1963); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944). Under the commerce clause, 
Congress is given the power "to regulate commerce ... among the several states." U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress' power under the commerce clause has been extended to 
intrastate commerce activities when they have such a "close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce 
from burdens and obstructions." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 
(1937). Congress has the "power to regulate the local incidents ... which might have a 
substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). Congress' power under the commerce clause is 
"broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no express constitu­
tional limitation[,] it has been the rule of this Court ... not to interfere." Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964). This power need not await disruption of commerce, 
but may be exerted to prevent disruption. Id. at 301. 
27. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935). "The inequality in bargain­
ing power between employees who do possess full freedom of association of actual liberty of 
contract, and employers ... organized in the corporate or other form of ownership ... 
burdens and affects the flow of commerce ...." 29 U.S.c. § 151 (1982). It is the "policy of 
the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow 
of commerce." Id. "The National Labor Relations Board created by this [Act] ... is 
continued as an agency of the United States ...." 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). 
28. 29 U.S.c. § 151 (1982). Congress declared that it is "the policy of the United 
States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of com­
merce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred." Id. 
29. Id. Congress determined that the declared United States policy could be 
achieved by "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by pro­
tecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing." Id. 
30. Id. 
31. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935) (quoting Texas & New 
Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood, 281 U.S. 548 (1930». Chairman William M. Leiserson, 
of the National Mediation Board observed that 
so long as the employers question the right of the employees to hire personnel 
managers ... then the employees have to fight for their rights. As soon as the 
[employer] began [to be amenable to negotiation] ... the type of labor leader ... 
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by denying power over controversies or practices of purely local signif­
icance which do not burden or threaten tq burden the free flow of 
commerce.32 
Section 153 of the NLRA created and established the National 
Labor Relations Board (Board).33 The Board is allowed to prosecute 
any inquiry necessary to its function34 in any part of the United 
States.35 The Board also has the authority, as prescribed by the Ad­
ministrative Procedure Act,36 to make, amend, and rescind the rules 
for the labor people was a more businesslike type, and he is a good deal like the 
fellow on the employer's side. 
Id. at 7-8. 
32. Id. at 9. The House of Representatives stated: 
The bill is based squarely on the power of Congress to regulate commerce among 
the several States and with foreign nations. It does not apply to controversies or 
practices of purely local significance which do not presently or potentially burden 
or obstruct the free flow of such commerce. 
Id. at 8-9. 
33. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). The Board consists of five members, although origi­
nally it consisted of three, who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. Id. The Board is then authorized to delegate to any group of three or more 
members any or all of the powers it may exercise. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982). The Board is 
under an obligation to make an annual report to Congress and the President to summarize 
significant case activities and operations. 29 U.S.c. § 153(c) (1982). The principal office of 
the Board is in the District of Columbia, however, members may meet and exercise the 
Board's powers in any other place. 29 U.S.c. § 155 (1982). The Board shall also have 
authority to make, amend, and rescind rules and regulations necessary to carry out the Act, 
in accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5. 29 U.S.c. § 156 (1982). 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). The Board is empowered to prevent any person from 
engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). After a 
violation has occurred, the Board shall have the power to issue a complaint with a notice 
for hearing. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). The Board may amend this complaint, at its dis­
cretion, any time prior to issuance of an order based on the complaint. Id. The Board, at 
its discretion, may hear testimony and/or arguments. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). If the 
Board finds that anyone named in the complaint engaged in or is engaging in unfair labor 
practices, the Board shall issue a cease and desist order or take necessary affirmative action 
to effectuate the policies of the Act. Id. Any order may be set aside or modified before itis 
filed in a court. 29 U.S.c. § 160(e) (1982). The Board may also petition the court of ap­
peals or district court (if on vacation) for enforcement of the order and/or for temporary 
relief or a restraining order for unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.c. §§ 160(e) & (j) (1982). 
During investigation of unfair labor practices, the Board has access to all evidence of the 
person being investigated and has similar powers to those of the judicial department in 
holding hearings. 29 U.S.c. § 161(1) (1982). The Board may decline jurisdiction over labor 
disputes involving any class or category of employee in which commerce is not sufficiently 
or substantially affected to warrant exercise of jurisdiction. 29 U.S.c. § 164(c) (1982). 
35. 29 U.S.C. § 155 (1982). See supra note 33 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of the creation and organization of the Board. 
36. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982). This section provides that the agency must give 
general notice of rule making unless the new rules are interpretive rules, general statements 
of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure or practice or when the agency, for good 
cause, believes that such notice is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest. 
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and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act37 and 
is empowered to prevent unfair labor practices affecting commerce.38 
By enacting the NLRA, Congress intended to give the Board the ful­
lest possible jurisdiction over the employee-employer relationship. 39 
Judicial review of Board decisions considers factual findings of the 
Board conclusive, if supported by substantial evidence in the record as 
a whole.40 Courts give the Board broad discretion in enforcing the 
provisions of the ACt.41 However, the United States Supreme Court, 
5 U.S.c. § 553(b) (1982). The agency must also give interested parties an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making process and to allow them to petition for issuance, amend­
ment, or repeal of a rule. 5 U.S.c. §§ 553(c) & (e) (1982). Further, the publication of a 
substantive rule must be made not less than 30 days before its effective date unless other­
wise provided for by the section. 5 U.S.c. § 553(d) (1982). 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). This section provides that the Board may 
make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by ... the Administrative 
Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this subchapter. 
Id. 
38. 29 U.S.c. § 160(a) (1982). This section, prevention of unfair labor practices, 
empowers the Board to 
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting com­
merce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or 
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise 
Id. 
39. The National Labor Relations Act evidences Congress' intent to exercise 
whatever constitutionally given power it has to regulate commerce. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 
306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939). The Board has jurisdiction as long as the effect on commerce is 
more than "de minimis." Id. In enacting the National Labor Relations Act, Congress left 
it to the Board as to whether particular practices and situations "adversely affect commerce 
when judged by the full reach of the constitutional power of Congress." Polish Nat'l Alli­
ance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944). "The extent to which the Board chooses to 
exercise its statutory jurisdiction is a matter of administrative policy within the Board's 
discretion ...." NLRB v. WGOK, Inc., 384 F.2d 500,502 (5th Cir. 1967). See supra note 
26 and accompanying text. 
40. 29 U.S.c. § 160(e) (1982). See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 
474 (1951). The legislation precludes courts from determining the substantiality of evi­
dence supporting a Board decision based on evidence which justified it, without looking to 
conflicting inferences and evidence. Id. at 487-88. The reviewing court may not override 
the Board's decision without looking at the "whole record" or because the court may have 
made a different choice. Id. at 488. However, the court is not barred from setting aside a 
decision when it cannot conscientiously find substantial evidence, in light of the entire rec­
ord, supporting the Board's decision. Id. The Board's findings on questions of fact are 
conclusive "when supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." NLRB v. 
Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691 (1951). 
41. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). In general, statu­
tory interpretation questions are for the courts to decide with adequate weight given to the 
administrator's decision. Id. at 130-31. However, in applying broad statutory terms which 
the administrator must initially determine, the court has a limited function. Id. at 131. 
The Board's determination unqer the Act is accepted if it has" 'warrant in the record' and 
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in at least one case, concluded that the Board did not properly exercise 
its jurisdiction because its distinction between "completely religious" 
and "merely religiously associated," in connection with religious 
schools, did not provide a workable guide for the exercise of discretion 
due to a degree of entanglement within the two distinctions.42 Before 
sanctioning such decisions, courts must find a clearly expressed affirm­
ative congressional intention present.43 
When Congress amended the NLRA in 1947,44 the Senate and 
House Reports emphasized the fact that Congress enacted the NLRA 
to prescribe fair and equitable rules of conduct between labor and 
management in their dealings affecting interstate commerce, to protect 
rights of these individual workers in their relations with labor organi­
a reasonable basis in law." Id. Due to the complexity of modern industry, Congress real­
ized the necessity of these flexible rules and, thus, gave the Board wide discretion in matters 
such as shaping the appropriate unit. Id. at 134. The extent to which the Board exercises 
its statutory jurisdiction is within its discretion; thus, absent extraordinary circumstances, 
determining when and if to exercise this jurisdiction is for the Board, not the court, to 
decide. NLRB v. WGOK, Inc., 384 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1967). The Board has broad 
discretion in determining whether to exercise its statutory jurisdiction. NLRB v. Austin 
Developmental Center, Inc., 606 F.2d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1979). "The Board's decisions 
will not be reversed absent a showing that it acted unfairly and caused substantial prejudice 
to the affected employers." Id. Although the Board must treat similar cases alike, it may 
deviate from prior guidelines to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Id. Courts should be 
reluctant to overturn the Board's judgment, substituting their own ideas, without some 
compelling evidence that the Board has "failed to measure up to its responsibility." NLRB 
v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398,414 (1947). 
42. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 495 (1979). The Board 
certified unions as bargaining agents of teachers in schools operated by the church. Id. at 
491. The Board based its jurisdiction on its policy of declining jurisdiction only when 
schools are "completely religious" and not "merely religiously associated." Id. at 495. The 
United States Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court denied the Board 
jurisdiction because its standard "failed to provide a workable guide for the exercise of 
discretion." Id. Further, the United States Supreme Court determined that 
in the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent to bring teachers in 
church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to con­
strue the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve diffi­
cult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses. 
Id. at 507. 
43. Id. at 500. The Court indicated that the Board's jurisdiction would be ques­
tioned in such cases involving "public questions particularly high in the scale of our na­
tional interest." Id. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 
U.S. 10, 17 (1963) (Court denied the Board's jurisdiction over foreign seamen). See also 
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (Court denied the Board's 
jurisdiction over foreign seamen on a foreign vessel docked in an American port, for, if 
Congress had intended to include such an important regulation within the Act, it would 
have stated as much). Such interference in the delicate area of international relations could 
only come from Congress' clearly expressed affirmative intention. Id. 
44. Ch. 120, title I, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). 
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zations, and to recognize the public interest in labor disputes affecting 
commerce because of public health, safety, and welfare considera­
tions.45 During amendment proceedings, the House proposed that the 
definition of "employer" be amended to exclude from employer status 
"any corporation, community chest, fund, or foundation organized 
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or 
educational purposes. , . no part of the net earnings of which inures to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."46 The House of 
Representatives felt that such organizations were not engaged in inter­
state commerce and were, therefore, subject exclusively to local con­
trol.47 The House justified its proposed exclusion by pointing out that 
such organizations are not engaged in "commerce" or interstate com­
merce,48 frequently assist local governments, and, therefore, should 
fall under local jurisdiction.49 The Senate proposed that the exclusion 
45. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. I, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1135, 1135. The House Committee of Conference stated that the 
purpose of the amendment of the bill was to 
prescribe fair and equitable rules of conduct to be observed by labor and manage­
ment in their relations with one another which affect commerce, to protect the 
rights of individual workers in their relations with labor organizations whose ac­
tivities affect commerce, to recognize the paramount public interest in labor dis­
putes affecting commerce that endanger the public health, safety, or welfare, and 
for other purposes . . . . 
Id. 
46. H.R. REP. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 158, 161 (1974). 
47. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 292, 303 (1974). The 
House of Representatives observed that 
[c]hurches, hospitals, schools, colleges, and societies for the care of the needy are 
not engaged in "commerce" and certainly not in interstate commerce. These in­
stitutions frequently assist local governments in carrying out their essential func­
tions, and for this reason should be subject to exclusive local jurisdiction. 
Id. 
48. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1135, 1137. The House of Representatives Committee of Confer­
ence stated that 
The other nonprofit organizations excluded under the House bill are not specifi­
cally excluded in the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances 
and in connection with purely commercial activities ... of such organizations or 
of their employees been considered as affecting commerce so as to bring them 
within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act. 
Id. 
49. The word "commerce," as used in the Constitution, is equivalent to "intercourse 
for the purposes of trade," including transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of com­
modities between citizens of different states. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298 
(1936). Interstate commerce comprehends all component parts of commercial intercourse 
between different states. Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 498 (1931). 
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include only "nonprofit corporations and associations operating hospi­
tals."50 The House Conference Committee agreed with the Senate ex­
clusion and indicated that the other nonprofit organizations, excluded 
under the House bill, would only "in exceptional circumstances and in 
connection with purely commercial activity ... of such organizations 
or of their employees" be brought within the jurisdiction of the 
NLRA.51 The Senate version of the exclusion was finally adopted. 
Congress eliminated this exclusion from the Act in 197452 and re­
placed it with special strike notice requirements applicable to such or­
ganizations. 53 The Committee reviewing the section determined that 
there was no acceptable reason to exclude these particular hospital 
employees from the coverage and protection of the NLRA.54 
In its present form, the NLRA gives the Board jurisdiction over 
"employee(s)." The definition of "employee" includes any employee 
except agricultural laborers, domestic servants working at an individ­
ual's home, persons employed by a spouse or parent, an independent 
contractor, a supervisor, persons employed by an employer subject to 
the Railway Labor Act, or persons employed by another person who is 
50. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 292, 303 (1974). 
51. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 5\0, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1135, 1137. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
52. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974). 
53. 29 U.S.C. § 183 (1982). The provision allows the Director of the Federal Media­
tion and Conciliation Service to assist resolution of the impasse, by establishing an impar­
tial Board of Inquiry to investigate the issues and make a written report to the parties. Id. 
The report is to consist of a finding of facts with recommendations for settling the dispute 
in a prompt, peaceful and just manner. Id. The Board of Inquiry appointed shall have no 
interest or involvement in the health care institution or employee organization(s) in the 
dispute. Id. The provision also provides for the selection and compensation of the Board 
of Inquiry. Id. Upon establishment of the Board of Inquiry and for 15 days after the 
Board of Inquiry issues its report, the parties shall not change the status quo in effect prior 
to the expiration of the contract or the impasse except by agreement. Id. See also S. REP. 
No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
3946,3948. 
54. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3946, 3948. The Committee decided that it was "in the public interest to 
insure the continuity of health care to the community and the care and well being of pa­
tients." Id. at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3949. Public 
interest also demands that employees not be deprived of their statutory rights. Id. The 
Committee hoped that "parties to a dispute in such an institution would be cognizant of 
such special problems and take steps ... to mitigate the effects of a scarcity of alternative 
... resources." Id. at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3950. 
Witnesses stressed the uniqueness of these institutions and the need to avoid disruption. Id. 
at 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3951. 
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not an employer as defined. 55 An "employer" includes anyone acting 
as agent of an employer, but does not include the United States, a 
Government corporation, any Federal Reserve Bank, any State or 
political subdivision thereof, any person subject to the Railway Labor 
Act, or any labor organization, its officers, or agents. 56 
An understanding of the NLRA is important in determining 
whether handicapped employees in sheltered workshops57 come 
within the jurisdiction of the Board. Other factors in consideration of 
handicapped employees' claims must also be considered. Handi­
capped individuals encounter special problems, unique to this pro­
tected group, which must be addressed. Congress has enacted special 
legislation which provides special protections to the handicapped in 
various ways. Part II of this comment focuses on this legislation and 
provides an overview of significant congressional action in this area. 




Congress enacted several statutory provisions in an effort to en­
courage self improvement and rehabilitation of the handicapped while 
still providing them with some extent of protection. 58 These statutes 
provide a basis for encouraging and controlling the development of 
handicapped individuals, enabling them to become more productive 
citizens. These legislative enactments provide an important basis for 
understanding congressional problems and goals as they relate to the 
handicapped. 
55. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a defini­
tion of "employee" under the NLRA. 
56. 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) (1982). See supra note 4 and accompanying text (or a defini­
tion of "employer" under the NLRA. 
57. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for the Department of Labor's definition 
of "sheltered workshop." 
58. Such provisions include: Wagner-O'Day Act, ch. 697, 52 Stat. 1196 (1938) 
(codified at 41 U.S.c. §§ 46-48 (1982», see infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for a 
further discussion; Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 
U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (1982», see infra notes 76-105 and accompanying text for a further 
discussion; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982», see infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text for a further 
discussion; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1­
9501 (1982», see infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text for a further discussion. 
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A. The Wagner-O'Day Act 59 
Congress enacted the Wagner-O'Day Act60 in 1938 to promote 
sheltered workshops for the blind, which were not-for-profit opera­
tions' providing work for sightless persons.61 The Senate noted that 
these types of workshops prevent sightless individuals from becoming 
public charges. Congress believed that the government should spare 
no effort to aid and assist these individuals by means other than relief 
grants.62 The statute was enacted to broaden the limited market for 
products produced in these workshops and, thereby, provide more job 
opportunities for the blind.63 In 1971, Congress expanded the Act64 to 
increase employment opportunities for all handicapped individuals 
and to promote employment of the blind and severely handicapped. 65 
Congress hoped that some of these individuals would acquire sufficient 
job skills to enable them to enter the competitive job market. 66 Con­
gress ultimately wanted to provide the blind and severely handicapped 
with skills making them more placeable in private industry, thereby 
turning these public assistance recipients into wage earners and tax­
payers.67 Congress also addressed concerns about the relationship be­
tween these handicapped workers, their workshops, and their fringe 
benefits. The concerns included unemployment benefits, Social Secur­
59. 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 (1982). 
60. Wagner-O'Day Act, ch. 697, 52 Stat. 1196 (1938) (codified at 41 U.S.c. §§ 46-48 
(1982». 
61. S. REP. No. 1330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938). The Senate referred to "several 
sheltered workshops for the blind ... which afford to some 3,000 sightless persons produc­
tive work." Id. These workshops are "not operated for profit." Id. 
62. Id. The Senate encouraged such action because "[t]he employment thus fur­
nished prevents workmen so engaged from becoming public charges." Id. See infra note 
63 and accompanying text. 
63. Id. The Senate provided that, after supplies from the Federal prisons were no 
longer available, "the Government [would] be required to purchase their brooms as well as 
mops from nonprofit-making agencies for the blind." Id. Their purchases would also ex­
tend to "other suitable commodities produced by the blind where the procurement of such 
commodities is not presently required" by another law. Id. The Senate also recognized 
that "opportunities for gainful employment to those ... with blindness are limited" and 
that "the Government should spare no effort to aid and assist them by means other than a 
relief grant." Id. 
64. Pub. L. No. 92-28, 85 Stat. 77 (1971). 
65. Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, 41 
C.F.R. § 51-1.1(a) (1988). 
66. H.R. REP. No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1079, 1093. Relative to the House of Representatives Report, the United 
States Department of Labor Report stated that the legislation was consistent "with the 
Department's objective to promote employment of the handicapped. Hopefully, it will as­
sist some of the severely handicapped to acquire sufficient job-skill proficiency to enter a 
competitive job situation." Id. 
67. Id. at 1080. 
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ity, and worker's compensation. Congress suggested that the Commit­
tee investigate these concerns. 68 
The Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely 
Handicapped69 was created by the Wagner-O'Day Act to oversee gov­
ernment purchases from the blind and other severely handicapped in­
dividuals70 employed in qualified nonprofit agencies7l for the blind and 
severely handicapped.72 The Act requires the government, or govern­
68. [d. at 1085. Congress stated that: 

This Committee's examination of the program has revealed another area of Con­

gressional concern, namely, the need to explore the relationship of the handi­

capped workers and their workshops to fringe benefits . . . . The Committee 

believes that studies of policies and practices of workshops with respect to . . . 

[fringe benefits] should be undertaken promptly by the Department of Labor or in 

cooperation with appropriate agencies. 

[d. 
69. Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, 41 
C.F.R. § 51-2 (1988). 
70. 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-47 (1982). 
71. A "qualified nonprofit agency for the blind" is defined as 
an agency organized under the laws of the United States or of any State, operated 
in the interest of blind individuals, and the net income of which does not inure in 
whole or in part to the benefit of any shareholder or other individual; which com­
plies with applicable occupational health and safety standards prescribed by the 
Secretary of Labor; and which in the production of commodities and the provi­
sion of services (whether or not the commodities or services are procured under 
these regulations) during the fiscal year employs blind individuals for not less 
than 75 percent of the man-hours of direct labor required for the production or 
provision of the commodities or services. 
Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, 41 C.F.R. § 51­
l.2(h) (1988). A "qualified nonprofit agency for other severely handicapped" is defined as 
an agency organized under the laws of the United States or of any State, operated 
in the interests of severely handicapped individuals who are not blind, and the net 
income of which does not inure in whole or in part to the benefit of any share­
holder or other individual; which complies with applicable occupational health 
and safety standards prescribed by the Secretary of Labor; and which in the pro­
duction of commodities and the provision of services (whether or not the com­
modities or services are procured under these regulations) during the fiscal year 
employs severely handicapped individuals for not less than 75 percent of the man­
hours of direct labor required for the production or provision of the commodities 
or services. 
Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, 41 C.F.R. 
§ 51.1.2(i) (1988). 
72. 41 U.S.c. § 47 (1982). The Committee is given the responsibility to "establish 
and. publish in the Federal Register a [procurement] list." 41 U.S.C. § 47(a)(I) (1982). 
The Committee also "shall designate a central nonprofit agency or agencies to facilitate the 
distribution ... for commodities and services on the procurement list among qualified 
nonprofit agencies for the blind or ... other severely handicapped." 41 U.S.c. § 47(c) 
(1982). It shall conduct "a continuing study and evaluation of its activities ... for the 
purpose of assuring effective and efficient administration ... of this title." 41 U.S.C. 
§ 47(e) (1982). The studies and evaluations address problems related to employment of the 
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ment agency, to procure a commodity or service on the procurement 
list from a blind or handicapped nonprofit agency, if available within 
the period needed,73 unless under a section 412174 exception.75 
The Wagner-O'Day Act is but one example of congressional in­
tent to provide special protections to the handicapped. The Fair La­
bor Standards Act is another provision which further evidences 
Congress' intent to protect the handicapped. 
B. The Fair Labor Standards Act 76 
Since its original enactment in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards 
Act77 has promoted economic justice and security for the lowest paid 
workers, created employment stability, and eliminated unfair competi­
tive labor practices.7s The policy of the Act is to correct and eliminate 
labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of minimum stan­
dards of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well~being 
of workers without substantially curtailing employment or earning 
power.79 
Upon receipt of a certificate issued by the Administrator of the 
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor,so the original 
act allowed subminimum rates to be paid to specified groups, inchid­
blind and handicapped and the development and adaptation of production methods en­
abling greater utilization of the handicapped. 41 U.S.c. § 47(e) (1982). 
73. 41 U.S.C. § 48 (1982). The government offices which order procurement list 
commodities and services obtain them from either the central nonprofit agency or the des­
ignated workshop. Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handi­
capped, 41 C.F.R. § 51-5.1-1 (1988). When the central nonprofit agency receives an order, 
it designates the workshop(s) that will produce the commodity orservice. 41 C.F.R: § 51­
5.1-2(a) (1988). The central nonprofit agency may also authorize the ordering officer to 
order directly from the workshop. 41 C.F.R. § 51-5.1-2(c) (1988). Under specified circum­
stances, the central nonprofit agency shall grant a purchase exception to the ordering office. 
41 C.F.R. § 51-5.2 (1988). The exception allows the ordering office to procure the com­
modity or service from a commercial source. Id. 
74. 18 U.S.C. § 4121 (1982). This provision creates Federal Prison Industries, Inc. 
Prison-made products, under the provisions, are to be purchased by Federal departments 
and Government institutions of the United States when such products meet their require­
ments and may be available. 18 U.S.C. § 4124 (1982). The products must be produced in 
the industries authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4121. Id. 
75. 41 U.S.C. § 48 (1982). 
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). 
77. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 201-219 (1982». 
78. S. REP. No. 640, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2241, 2241. . 
79. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). 
80. 29 C.F.R. § 525.2(a) (1987). The Administrator is appointed by the President, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982). The Administrator 
submits an annual report to Congress including information, data, and recommendations 
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ing handicapped workers.8) The Act was amended in 1961 in re­
sponse to questions raised about the adequacy of minimum wage 
protection for handicapped employees, especially those in sheltered 
workshops.82 When the Secretary of Labor grants a sheltered work­
shop certificate to an individual workshop, it specifies minimum opera­
tional requirements, but leaves workshop managers with broad 
discretion in deciding appropriate wage rates. 83 This rate may fall 
somewhere between certificate minimum84 and statutory minimum. 85 
The Senate observed that the procedure, although flexible, permitted 
abuse at the expense of the handicapped.86 The Senate also noted that 
there were complaints that these wages were inadequate, allowing 
which he finds advisable for legislation connected with the Fair Labor Standards Act that 
he finds advisable. 29 U.S.C. § 204(d)(I) (1982). 
81. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also Walling v. Portland Termi­
nal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 151-52 (1947) (employers of the handicapped must pay them mini­
mum wage, unless a permit or certificate allowing them not to pay minimum wage is 
obtained from the Administrator). 
82. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1620, 1665. 
83. Employment of Handicapped Clients in Sheltered Workshops, 29 C.F.R. § 525 
(1987). A sheltered workshop is defined as a "charitable organization or institution con­
ducted not for profit but for the purpose of carrying out a recognized program of rehabilita­
tion ... or other occupational rehabilitating activity of educational or therapeutic nature" 
for handicapped workers. 29 C.F.R. § 525.2(b) (1987). In issuing a special certificate for a 
sheltered workshop, the Administrator may consider certain specified criterion, including 
but not limited to, present or past earnings of the handicapped workers; whether wages are 
commensurate with those paid to nonhandicapped workers in the vicinity for like work; 
nature and extent of the disabilities involved; wages of comparable work in private indus­
try; types and duration of other rehabilitative services given to handicapped workers; extent 
of worker's previous experience; and whether the organization is exempt under section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and has registered as a non-profit organization. 29 
C.F.R. § 525.7 (1987). The regulations also establish requirements for those operating 
under such certificates as well as grounds for review or revocation of said certificates. 29 
C.F.R. § 525 (1987). See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a complete definition of 
"sheltered workshop." 
84. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c) (1982 & Supp. IV. 1986). The Secretary issues special certifi­
cates to those who employ handicapped individuals-thereby allowing them to pay wages 
to such individuals that are lower than statutory minimum wag.e; commensurate to wages 
paid to nonhandicapped employees in the same vicinity doing the same type, quality and 
quantity of work; and related to productivity. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(I) (Supp. IV 1986). No 
employer can reduce this certificate wage rate for at least two years without prior authori­
zation of the Secretary. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). See also Walling v. Port­
land Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947) (discussing the necessity of obtaining a certificate 
before being authorized to pay handicapped employees less than minimum wage). 
85.29 U.S.c. § 206 (1982). 
86. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1620, 1665. Congress observed that "subminimum rates ... while com­
mendably flexible, also obviously permits ready abuse at the expense of handicapped work­
ers, particularly in the absence of a vigorous investigation and enforcement program." Id. 
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these workshops to undercut competitive industry.87 The Senate sug­
gested that either an administrative or, if need be, a statutory remedy 
could be used to curb these abuses.88 Later, Congress incorporated its 
own handicapped employee minimum wage requirement. 89 The re­
quirement provided a wage of not less than fifty percent of the statu­
tory minimum wage, commensurate with those wages paid to 
nonhandicapped employees who have the same type, quality, and 
quantity of work in the same vicinity and with the same productivity 
level.90 Congress established these requirements in order to improve 
the economic standards of the handicapped, assure their rapid ad­
vancement into private industry, and to reduce exploitation through 
wages.91 In 1986, in response to the increasingly large number of se­
verely handicapped individuals employed by sheltered workshops, 
Congress amended the Act92 by eliminating the fifty percent of mini­
mum wage provision and providing wage review procedures.93 Con­
gress enacted the amendment "to provide a more rational, fair and 
objective basis for determining wages to be paid to handicapped em­
ployees with impaired productivity while fully protecting the rights of 
individual workers."94 Because sheltered workshop employers are 
given great management flexibility, Congress intended to ensure that 
handicapped workers would receive procedural due process protection 
87. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1620, 1665. The Senate observed that with the substantial growth in the 
number of sheltered workshops, workshops are able to significantly undercut competitive 
industries which are obligated to pay their workers minimum wage. Id. 
88. Id. The Senate felt that while wage rates in sheltered workshops were "com­
mendably flexible, [it] also obviously permits ready abuse at the expense of handicapped 
workers." Id. The Senate felt that "more satisfactory standards can be accomplished 
through administrative machinery now functioning." Id. If this method did not succeed, 
the Senate hoped "to explore and develop formal statutory standards to assure adequate 
minimum wage protection for all handicapped persons." Id. 
89. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1982). 
90. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938). 
91. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3002, 3025. The Senate stated that it believed that the amendment "serves 
the purpose of improving the economic circumstances of handicapped workers, speeding 
their movement into fully productive private employment, and assuring that such workers 
are not exploited through low wages." Id. 
92. Pub. L. No. 99-486, 100 Stat. 1229 (1986). 
93. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text for discussion of procedure. 
94. 132 CONGo REC, S13,860 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
The amendment was also drafted to allow for "procedural due process safeguards for hand­
icapped employees who are paid under special minimum wage rate certificates." Id. This 
due process protection was thought to be necessary to protect "this vulnerable sector of our 
work force." Id. Included with the joint statement in the Record are letters supporting the 
amendment from associations involved in the servicing and employment of the handi­
capped. Id. 
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guaranteeing wages commensurate with productivity.95 Congress 
hoped that, by enacting the present legislation, workers would be 
guaranteed wages according to individual productivity while reducing 
the employers' paperwork enough to allow for concentration on im­
proving client services.96 Congress hoped that employer's concentra­
tion on services would aid and further the positions of the 
handicapped. 
In order to prevent curtailment of opportunities for employment 
of certain specified individuals, the Fair Labor Standards Act97 allows 
the Secretary of Labor, by regulation or order, to provide for the em­
ployment of, among others, individuals "whose earning or productive 
capacity is impaired by age, physical or mental deficiency."98 The Sec­
retary shall allow wages paid to such individuals to be "lower than the 
minimum wage applicable under section 206,"99 "commensurate with 
those paid to nonhandicapped workers" for the same type, quality and 
quantity in the same vicinity,IOO and "related to the individual's pro­
95. 132 CONGo REC. H8825 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Murphy). 
Representative Murphy stated that: 
Since we are granting employers greater flexibility to manage their handi­
capped enterprises, it is absolutely essential that we preserve protections for hand­
icapped workers which guarantees wages commensurate with their productivity. 
Thus, H.R. 5614 provides a necessary procedural due process safeguard for hand­
icapped workers who are paid under special minimum wage rate certificates .... 
This due process protection is an essential element in the compromise legisla­
tion before us and will hopefully insure against exploitation of this vulnerable 
sector of our workforce. 
Id. 
96. 132 CONGo REc. H8826 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Petri). Rep­
resentative Petri observed that: 
The intent of the bill is to rationalize and simplify the administration of shel­
tered workshops, not to lower or change what anyone is paid. The current system 
of multiple certificates has been called an administrative nightmare .... By mak­
ing these improvements ... we can free both the Labor Department and the 
workshops to spend more of their time on improving services to clients .... 
. . . These [special] provisions allow employment opportunities for handi­
capped persons who would not be able to compete for jobs in the regular labor 
marketplace if the regular minimum wage had to be paid. 
Id. 
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). 
98. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(I) (Supp. IV 1986). 
99. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(I)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). 
100. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(I)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Representative Murphy emphasized 
the necessity of this standard in the statute by explaining that since Congress is "granting 
employers greater flexibility to manage their handicapped enterprises [by eliminating the 
fifty percent of minimum wage floor], it is absolutely essential that we preserve protections 
for handicapped workers which guarantees wages commensurate with their productivity." 
132 CONGo REc. H8825 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Murphy). See supra 
note 95 and accompanying text. 
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ductivity."101 Employers qualifying under this section must provide 
written assurances that wages will be reviewed every six months and 
adjusted at least once a year, to reflect wages paid to comparable non­
handicapped employees,102 a,nd must not reduce the wages of a handi­
capped individual for two years without prior authorization of the 
Secretary.103 Any employee or guardian of the employee may petition 
the Secretary to initiate a review of the wage rate. 104 Under the Act, 
employers are not prohibited from "maintaining or establishing work 
activities centers to provide therapeutic activities for handicapped 
clients." 105 
Although the Fair Labor Standards Act focused on stabilizing 
and assuring a wage level for handicapped employees, other issues in 
the handicapped empioyment situation needed to be addressed. Con­
gress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in response to these addi­
tional issues and concerns. 
C. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 106 
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to promote vo­
cational rehabilitation and more independent living through, among 
other programs, employment of the handicapped. 107 The state 
101. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(I)(C) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 95 & 100 and accom­
panying text. 
102. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). The provision provides that the Secre­
tary 	of Labor 
shall not issue a certificate ... unless the employer provides written assurances to 
the Secretary that ... wages paid ... will be reviewed by the employer at periodic 
intervals at least once every six months, and ... will be adjusted by the employer 
at periodic intervals, at least once each year, to reflect changes in the prevailing 
wage paid to experienced non handicapped individuals employed in the locality 
for essentially the same type of work. 
Id. 
103. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). Sheltered workshops are restricted fur­
ther for "no employer shall be permitted to reduce the hourly wage rate prescribed by 
certificate under this subsection ... of any handicapped individual for a period of two years 
from such date without prior authorization of the Secretary." Id. 
104. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1986). The Secretary must determine if the 
wage is justified in the particular circumstance. Id. If the petition is brought, the employer 
has the burden of proving the wage is necessary in order to prevent curtailment of employ­
ment opportunities. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(5)(c) (Supp. IV 1986). 
105. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1986). 
106. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 70l-796i (1982». 
107. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2079. The Committee sought to "improve in every possible respect 
the lives as well as livelihood of [handicapped] individuals served." Id. The Act not only 
was intended to promote a "better basic progran:t of service" but also was "designed to 
focus research and training activities on making employment and participation in society 
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agency lO8 involved is required to place handicapped individuals in em­
ployment or training whenever possible and to review and evaluate 
periodically the status of handicapped individuals placed in extended 
employment in rehabilitation facilities, like sheltered workshops.109 
The review is designed to determine the feasibility of the employment 
in the competitive labor market. I 10 Under the Act, the federal govern­
ment is authorized to review and amend state programs whenever it 
deems it necessary for enforcement of the policies and purposes of the 
Act. 111 Vocational rehabilitation goods and services necessary for the 
employment of the handicapped include training and recruitment 
services as well as providing new employment for handicapped indi­
viduals. 1I2 Group rehabilitation may be in the form of public or non­
profit facilities and services that promise to contribute substantially to 
the rehabilitation of the group. I 13 
The Rehabilitation Act was created to develop and implement 
prqgrams of vocational rehabilitation and independent living. 114 The 
legislation is intended to improve every possible aspect of the lives and 
livelihoods of the handicapped and other individuals II 5 through serv­
ices responsive to each individual's needs as well as ensuring that no 
individual, especially the severely handicapped, would be excluded. I 16 
Although not possible in many cases, the ultimate goal of the Act is to 
more feasible for handicapped individuals." Id. at 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2092. 
108. 29 u.s.c. § 721 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). To qualify to participate, a state is 
required to submit to the Commissioner a three-year plan for vocational rehabilitation. Id. 
The plan has to "designate a State agency as the sole State agency to administer ... or to 
supervise" administration of the plan. Id. The Act further designates specific qualifica­
tions and requirements for each segment of the handicapped population. Id. 
109. 29 u.s.c. § 721(a)(16) (Supp. IV 1986). 
110. Id. 
Ill. 29 u.s.c. § 721(a)(19) (1982). 
112. 29 U.S.C. § 723(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). 
113. 29 U.S.C. § 723(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). 
114. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV 1986). 
115. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2076,2079. 
116. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2079. Con­
gress attempted to develop a 
method of providing services which would be responsive to individual needs and 
would ensure that no individual would be excluded from the program merely 
because his handicap appeared to be too severe. The Committee thus expanded 
the range of services to be provided and sought to assure that there would be a 
first priority to serve those individuals with the most severe handicaps. 
Id. Congress indicated "the new thrust of the bill [is] that individuals who apply for serv­
ices must be given every opportunity to achieve a vocational goal." Id. at 19, reprinted in 
1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2092. See supra note 107 and accompanying 
text. 
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prepare individuals for work in competitive industry and to allow a 
more independent life,117 emphasizing the view that a productive and 
financially independent life is desirable. I IS 
The 1973 revisions of the Rehabilitation Act sought to provide 
more complete and comprehensive services for a large number of the 
severely handicapped by setting up a committee to study the role and 
running of sheltered workshops employing the handicapped. 119 The 
1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act included a provision­
White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act-allowing 
the President to call a conferencel2o to focus greater public attention 
on the problems and needs of these individuals and to vitalize the com­
mitment of the United States to overcome these problems. 121 The Act 
was revised in 1978122 in order to provide more extensive employment 
opportunities for the handicapped. 123 Such programs include provid­
ing a community service program for employment of the handicapped 
and entering jointly financed projects with private industry for on-the­
job training and employment for the handicapped. 124 
Congress has addressed and incorporated protections and privi­
leges for sheltered workshops and other charitable organizations in 
117. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2092. While 
Congress wishes the programs in the Act to "remain vocationally oriented, it does not 
believe that there are handicapped individuals whose handicaps are so severe, or because of 
other circumstances, such as age, that they may never achieve employment. The Commit­
tee feels that they should not be denied services." Id. Congress strived to find methods so 
that "such individuals may gain entrance to the vocational rehabilitation program or may 
be enabled to live more independently." Id. at 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 2093. The amendments to this Act expand "comprehensive rehabilita­
tion services to enable individuals for whom a vocational goal was not presently possible to 
prepare to live more independently." Id. at 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD­
MIN. NEWS at 2079. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
118. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2079. See 
supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
119. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357. This amendment 
is just one of the examples of the numerous amendments of the Rehabilitation Act since its 
original enactment as the Smith-Fees Act in 1920. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 
reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2082. Although originally 
concerned with veterans, the Act has progressively changed and modified in order to serve 
a larger and more diversified group of individuals with more expansive service and pro­
grams. Id. 
120. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617, 
1631-34. 
121. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6401. 
122. Pub. L. No. 95-602,92 Stat. 2955 (1978). 
123. H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 7312, 7312-13. 
124. Id. 
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more generalized statutory enactments. These protections and privi­
leges indicate a congressional concern for such organizations and the 
individuals they serve. 
D. The Internal Revenue Code 125 
Incentives and protections for the handicapped and sheltered 
workshops have also been provided for within the federal income tax 
system. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has exempted certain 
corporations fro~ paying taxes, 126 including those corporations organ­
ized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, where no part of 
the net earnings are for the benefit of any private shareholder or indi­
vidual and where no activity attempting to influence legislation or a 
political campaign exists. 127 Sheltered workshops have qualified under 
this definition of the exempt corporation. 128 
This "charitable purpose" exemption was originally introduced 
into the Internal Revenue Code prior to the Reform Act of 1939129 
and has remained intact. l3O The 1954 enactment l3l was developed 
through extensive and lengthy study of the ways and means to remove 
tax inequities and restraints, increase employment, and produce a 
125. 26 U.S.c. §§ 1-9501 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
126. 26 U.S.C. § SOl (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
127. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
128. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts have determined that simi­
lar organizations have qualified as exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3). The IRS stud­
ied a nonprofit organization which operated a number of community programs, including 
classes, counseling services, and job training, which centered around the manufacture and 
sale of a product. Rev. Rul. 73-128, 1973-1 I.R.B. 222. These programs provided unskilled 
and unemployed individuals with skills which eventually enabled them to obtain permanent 
employment. Id. The IRS determined that the organization qualified for the exemption 
since its operations accomplished a charitable purpose. Id. The determinative question is 
whether the organization's operation of its manufacturing facilities is a means of accom­
plishing the charitable purpose or merely an end in itself. Id. "Providing vocational train­
ing and guidance to the unskilled and under-employed ... may qualify as a charitable 
purpose so long as the manner of its achievement is otherwise charitable." Id. at 223.. A 
charitable tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) depends on common-law standards of charity 
by serving a public purpose and is not to be contrary to established public policy. Bob 
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983). These exemptions are justified 
because the exempt entity confers a public benefit which the society or community may not 
choose or be able to provide or which supplements and advances work of public institutions 
supported by tax revenues. Id. at 591. Further, a corporation that was organized to oper­
ate a camp and services for the deaf and that realized a profit which was devoted to mainte­
nance of its operations was exempt for income tax purposes. Jack Little Found. for Aid to 
Deaf v. Jones, 102 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Okla. 1951). 
129. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. Act. No.1, H. R. 2762. 
130. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 4025, 4025. 
131. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3. 
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higher standard of living. \32 However, abuse of the exempt status 
prompted Congress, in 1969,133 to enact pro.visions to tighten permis­
sive activities of private foundations-to prevent self dealing between 
the foundation and its contributors, to require distribution of income 
for charitable purposes, to limit holdings of private businesses, and to 
assure that activities are restricted as provided by the exemption. 134 
Congress attempted to achieve, through these and other revisions, a 
fair and more efficient tax system. 135 
All of these statutory provisions seem to indicate a congressional 
concern of protection of the handicapped. This apparent concern, 
however, has not been specifically incorporated into the NLRA. As a 
result, courts have applied various interpretations in determining 
whether handicapped individuals in sheltered workshops are "employ­
ees" within the NLRA and, thus, within the jurisdiction of the Board. 
III. CASE HISTORY INVOLVING THE DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE" 
WITHIN THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
A. The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind136 
An early Board decision interpreting the word "employee" as de­
fined in the NLRA137 involved the Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind. 
The Chicago Lighthouse is a northern Illinois nonprofit organization 
that serves the blind community through fifteen different programs, 
including ad~issions and evaluations, vocational job placement in the 
community, work adjustment, and on-the-job training which prepares 
blind persons to move into competitive job situations. The work ad­
justment and on-the-job training is done in an assembly and packaging 
sheltered workshop, which subcontracts with several private employ­
ers.138 The job training and counseling program lasts about twelve 
weeks, at the end of which time the employee is ready for competitive 
employment. The workshop, however, continues to employ these in­
dividuals until an opportunity in the private sector occurs. In one 
year, the organization's total income was about $1,600,000.00; of this 
132. Id. 
133. Pub. L. No. 91-172,83 Stat. 492 (1969). 
134. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1648. 
135. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2028. 
136. 225 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976). 
137. See supra notes 5 & 55 and accompanying text for an explanation of the word 
"employee" under the NLRA. 
138. The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249,249 (1976). 
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amount, a little over $500,000.00 came from private subcontracts; and 
the rest came from Government and private grants, donations, and . 
funds. 139 
The petitioner, a union, sought to represent a unit consisting of 
the employees and clients of the Chicago Lighthouse's two facilities. 
The Regional Director concluded that the Chicago Lighthouse's activ­
ities are "intimately connected with [ ] educating and training blind 
persons to enhance their employment opportunities in the outside 
community and thus are noncommercial." The Regional Director re­
fused to assert ju!isdiction and allow the unionization of the 
organization. 140 
The Board, in accordance with the St. Aloysius decision, 141 re­
fused to deny jurisdiction based solely on the charitable function or 
worthy purpose. It instituted a policy to classify such employers ac­
cording to what they do in order to determine whether the Board may 
assert jurisdiction. The Board determined that this employer, for all 
intents and purposes, was engaged in the nonretail performance of 
services. The Board asserted jurisdiction over the employees based on 
the St. Aloysius decision and determined that, because the organization 
derived a substantial amount of money from private subcontracts, it 
effectuated the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction. 142 
B. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind ofHouston 143 
Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston is a nonprofit, charitable 
corporation that provides services and programs for the visually im­
paired. Among these programs and services is the operation of work­
shops and services for the community. The corporation supports these 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. The Rhode Island Catholic Orphan Asylum, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976). The 
St. Aloysius court addressed the issue of whether a nonprofit institution was an "employer" 
within the meaning of the NLRA. Id. Although, traditionally, the Board had declined to 
assert jurisdiction over this type of employer simply because of its nonprofit status and its 
noncommercial activities closely related to a charitable purpose, the Board decided that, 
due to removal of the health care exemption from the NLRA definition of "employer," the 
only basis for declining jurisdiction over charitable organizations was a finding of insuffi­
cient impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 1344-45. The Board interpreted Congress' 
deletion as eliminating the distinction between profit and nonprofit institutions and, thus, 
eliminating the distinction between charitable and noncharitable organizations. Id. at 
1345. Chairman Murphy, in his dissenting opinion, felt that Congress intended such orga­
nizations to be exempt from jurisdiction unless they had a "substantial" impact on com­
merce. Id. at 1347. Murphy based this interpretation on legislative history. Id. 
142. The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. at 250. 
143. 696 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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programs through state and federal funding and profits from work­
shops "A" and "B".I44 Workshop "A" operates at a fairly substantial 
profit and is not supported by public or private funds. 145 Workshop 
"B" consists of severely handicapped employees who are paid fifty per­
cent of minimum wage; while workshop "A" consists of ninety per­
cent blind individuals who are paid wages reflecting productivity, 
beginning at least at minimum wage. Employees are given merit in­
creases and provided with worker's compensation, unemployment, 
and hospital insurance. Workshop "A" also provides pension rights, 
paid holidays, vacations, sick leave, and overtime. A system of pro­
gressive discipline is used for low productivity, improper performance, 
and tardiness. No formal employee placement in private industry is 
provided; however, three to four employees are annually placed on an 
ad hoc basis. Many of the employees are employed for ten to twenty­
year periods. 146 
A union had been duly certified as the exclusive bargaining repre­
sentative of the Houston Lighthouse's employees, but the Houston 
Lighthouse refused to bargain collectively with the union. The Re­
gional Director supervised the election of the union, claiming that the 
Board had jurisdiction over Houston Lighthouse with respect to per­
sons employed in its workshop. In response, Houston Lighthouse filed 
a request for review arguing that the Regional Director had departed 
from Board precedent and that the Board had improperly asserted ju­
risdiction over institutions such as Houston Lighthouse. The Board 
affirmed the Director's decision and determined that it effectuated the 
purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction and that the Houston Light­
house's clients were "employees" under the NLRA.147 
The Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals upheld the 
Board decision that these individuals were "employees" within the 
meaning of the NLRA.148 The decision hinged on a determination of 
whether the essential nature of the workshop was "rehabilitative"149 
or "typically industrial."150 The Board decided not to assert jurisdic­
tion over those operations that were primarily rehabilitative or thera­
peutic in function, but rather, to assert jurisdiction over those 
144. Id. at 401-02. 
145. Id. at 406. 
146. Id. at 403. 
147. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 248 N.L,R.B. 1366, 1366 (1980). 
148. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 407. See supra 
notes 5 & 55 and accompanying text for an explanation of "employee" under the NLRA. 
149. Id. at 404-06. See infra note 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of this 
standard. 
150. Id. See infra note 153 and accompanying text for a discussion of this standard. 
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organizations with predominately business or economic characteris­
tiCS. ISI The court determined that working at workshop "A" was con­
tingent upon certain typical business criteria. The court stated that 
employees were working under "commercial and business conditions." 
The decision was based on the fact that employees were compensated 
at or above minimum wage, received merit raises, were disciplined for 
low productivity, punched a clock, had production deadlines, and 
worked a forty-hour week. Also, employees, in many instances, were 
permanently employed, and the workshop was not supported by addi­. . 
tional outside funds, but ran the facilities for .the most part on profits 
from the workshops. Because the court determined that these charac­
teristics were typical of working conditions and work environments 
normally subject to collective bargaining, the court ruled that the 
workshop should fall under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Re­
lations Board. ls2 The court concluded that the Lighthouse for the 
Blind of Houston should follow Cincinnati Association for the Blind v .. 
NLRB IS3 due to the similarities in operational, productivity, compen­
sation, and marketing factors between the two cases. IS4 The Cincin­
nati court developed an "economic" pattern in which business 
characteristics predominate rather than the "therapeutic" pattern of 
Goodwill Industries of Southern California. ISS The court recognized 
151. !d. at 404. 
152. Id. at 405-06. 
153. 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982). Cincinnati Association is a nonprofit corporation 
dedicated to the interests of the visually impaired. It offers training, counseling, and social 
services to all blind members of the community. Id. at 569. The workshop, employing 
. seventy blind and four sighted individuals, made $144,000.00 in profits that it used to de­
fray unrelated expenses. Id. Blind individuals are paid on a piece work basis while sighted 
individuals receive an hourly wage. Id. All employees work a forty-hour week, receive 
paid holidays, and paid vacation time, worker's compensation and life insurance, and are 
disciplined for serious misconduct. Id. at 570. The court determined that the program 
contemplated long term employment with very few leaving into the competitive market. 
Id. 
The Board and the court were faced with deciding whether handicapped workers in 
sheltered workshops are "employees" under the NLRA. The court discussed the fact that 
sheltered workshop workers were not, as a matter of law, excluded from the NLRA. The 
court was faced with deciding whether the Board had adequate facts characterizing shel­
tered workshop employees as "employees" under the NLRA. Id. at 572. The court upheld 
the decision of the Board, deferring to the Board's discretion in determining the employees' 
status. Id. at 572-73. However, the court agreed with the Board that the case strongly 
suggested that the " 'rehabilitative' and 'therapeutic' nexus is ... subordinate to routine 
business considerations." Id. at 571. The Board concluded that the similarities between 
clients and private workers outweighed the differences and that economic motives prevailed 
despite the professed therapeutic orientation. Id. at 572-73. The Board stated that, overall, 
the workshop was based on economic considerations. Id. at 573. 
·154. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 406. 
155. 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977). Goodwill is a nonprofit, charitable organization pro­
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the Board's broad discretion in determining the status of individuals 
under the NLRA and the well established limited review of such deci­
sions by the court.156 The court found no error in the Board's deter­
mination. The court also noted that there was no congressional policy 
establishing that collective bargaining is totally inconsistent with a re­
habilitative activity. 157 
C. Key Opportunities, Inc. 158 
Key Opportunities operates a sheltered workshop employing sev­
enty to eighty mentally, emotionally, socially, or physically handi­
capped "clients." Key Opportunities' "work activities" program 
serves about thirty clients who, due to their handicaps, would in all 
probability always need a sheltered workshop. Clients receive wages 
which vary according to production, punch a time clock, work regular 
hours, receive paid holidays and vacations, and are disciplined for mis­
behavior. Key Opportunities does not make a profit. 159 
The Board refused to assert jurisdiction over the clients at Key 
viding rehabilitative work experience to individuals whose handicaps make them ineligible 
for ~ork in the private competitive job market. Id. Ninety-five percent of Goodwill's in­
come is generated through sales in its stores of items discarded and restored by its "employ­
ees." Id. The other five percent of its income is gained through monetary contributions. 
Id. Of the 750 people employed by Goodwill, 100 are staff and supervisory employees, 80 
to 100 are client trainees referred from a state agency on a fee basis, and 650 to 670 are 
handicapped persons, referred to as "clients." Id. Clients are allowed to work at their own 
pace, and they receive the same hourly wage, life insurance, and paid vacations. Id. at 537. 
Clients are disciplined on an interview basis, and disciplinary discharges are rare. Id. 
Goodwill furnishes clients with rehabilitation, social services, vocational, medical, and legal 
counseling as well as employing a job placement specialist for finding jobs for clients in 
private industry. Id. Half of the client positions are reserved for extended employment 
while the other half are designated for transitional employment. Id. 
The Board was confronted with deciding whether the Goodwill employees were "em­
ployees" under the NLRA, and thus, within the Board's jurisdiction. The Board deter­
mined that Goodwill's concern is for rehabilitating its clients and not for producing a 
product for profit. Id. The Board considered the facts that the clients are hired regardless 
of the severity of their impairment and are paid the same wage regardless of their produc­
tivity level, as an instrument of the rehabilitative process. Id. Goodwill is considered to be 
one of the rare instances where an employer's concern for his employees competes with and 
displaces the union's normal objectives. Id. It was determined that to allow collective 
bargaining in such a setting would risk a harmful intrusion on the rehabilitative process. 
Id. The Board held that to assert jurisdiction in this case would not only be likely to distort 
the unique employee-employer relationship and impair the employer's ability to accomplish 
its salutary objectives, but it would not effectuate the purposes of the National Labor Rela­
tions Act. Id. at 538. The Board dismissed the union's petition upon deciding that these 
employees were not "employees" under the NLRA. Id. 
156. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 404. 
157. Id. at 407. 
158. 265 N.L.R.B. 1371 (1982). 
159. Id. at 1373. 
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Opportunities due to its determination that the clients were not "em­
ployees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. 
The Board determined that Key Opportunities did not employ indi­
viduals expecting to benefit from their output, but that their sole pur­
pose was to provide work rehabilitation and work-based therapy for 
handicapped individuals. The organization intended only to provid~ 
jobs as a form of therapy, and thus, their only hiring criterion was 
whether the client would benefit. The Board justified its decision by 
stating that the "exploitation" which the National Labor Relations 
Act attempts to regulate only exists where a person employs another 
person to derive some net benefit from the other's output. l60 
This overriding therapeutic purpose distinguishes "employees" 
from "clients." This analytical approach has been determinative in 
other situations involving sh~ltered workshops employing handi­
capped individuals. 
IV. ARKANSAS LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND v. NLRBI61­
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 

The Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind was brought before the 
Board in 1987 for engaging in unfair labor practices as q.escribed in the 
National Labor Relations Act. Arkansas Lighthouse was accused of 
violating provisions of the NLRA by, among other things, threatening 
employees with plant closings and/or loss of work, promising in­
creased compensation to discourage union support, refusing to bargain 
with the union, soliciting revocations of union authorization cards, 
and interrogating employees. 162 The Arkansas Lighthouse claimed 
that their handicapped workers did not fall within the definition of 
"employee" as covered by the NLRA.163 The Board dismissed the 
Lighthouse's argument and determined that the Lighthouse workers 
are "employees" within the NLRA.I64 The Board looked to a deter­
mination of an industrial versus a rehabilitative purpose of the organi­
zation in deciding that it was not rehabilitative in nature and, thus, 
within the jurisdiction of the Board. 165 Arkansas Lighthouse appealed 
this decision to the court of appeals for review of the Board's 
determination. 
Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind is a nonprofit, charitable cor­
160. Id. at 1374. 
161. 851 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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poration which is engaged in manufacturing products under a shel­
tered workshop certificate issued by the Department of Labor under 
section 14(c)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 166 Eighty-four per­
cent of the Lighthouse's employees are blind. Although the Light­
house may pay its workers'fifty percent of minimum wage under the 
sheltered workshop certificate, all of the employees are paid identical 
hourly wages above minimum wage, regardless of productivity and 
length of service and receive yearly increases. Employees are disci­
plined for serious misconduct and may be discharged for severe of­
fenses. However, employees do have a grievance procedure as 
established by the employee manual. 167 Employees work a full work 
week, punch a time clock, and receive overtime compensation, insur­
ance benefits, unemployment benefits, worker's compensation, and 
paid holidays and vacation time. 168 The Lighthouse does not provide 
social and counseling services or a recreational area for its employees. 
or the blind community as a whole, but merely complies with the De" 
partment of Labor requirements for placement and counseling by, 
sending an annual list of clients capable of competitive employment tp 
the Office of the Blind and Visually Impaired. 169 
The employees, referred by the state Office of the Blind and Visu­
ally Impaired (about 98%), undergo a thirty-day training period after 
which they are retained if minimum production requirements are sat­
isfied. Clients not producing sufficiently may be involuntarily trans­
ferred to another department or not recalled from a layoff. However, 
clients are never forced to leave, even if capable of working elsewhere. 
On occasion, the Lighthouse has removed sighted employees to mak,e, 
jobs available to clients, and at one point, a job position was subd~~. 
vided into two in order to make room for a client. 170 Actual produc­
tion ranges from under fifty to about eighty percent that of a sighted 
employee with about thirty-five to forty percent of the workers pro­
ducing close to eighty percent; fifty percent produce at about fifty to 
sixty percent; and ten to fifteen percent produce at a lower rate. 171 
The ultimate goal of the Lighthouse is to place its employees in 
private industry. In prior years, the actual number of placements has 
166, Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 181 (8th Cir, 1988). 
See supra notes 76-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. 
167. Id. at 181. 
168. Id. at 182. 
169. Id. at 183-84. 
170. Id. at 183. 
171. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (1987). 
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ranged from five to eight per year. The Lighthouse sells over ninety 
percent of its products to the government under contracts pursuant to 
the Wagner-O'Day Act. l72 Although annual sales exceeded 
$500,000.00 with over $50,000.00 of that being shipped to points 
outside of the state, the Lighthouse does not make a profit. 173 
The court stated that the National Labor Relations Board took a 
much too restrictive view of what constitutes "rehabilitation" or 
"therapy."174 The court held that the Board abused its discretion and 
declared that the Lighthouse's employees were not employees within 
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, thereby denying the 
Board jurisdiction over these workers.175 
The court explained that although the Act defines the word "em­
ployee" very broadly, the Board has subdivided the term into two dis­
tinct groups. The first group is considered to be "rehabilitative" or 
"therapeutic," and the second is "primarily industrial."176 Although 
the Lighthouse operations resemble that of private industry, this is as 
much an instrument of the rehabilitative process as any other aspect. 
Especially determinative was the fact that all employees are paid an 
equal wage regardless of productivity. The court stated that wages 
related to productivity and tenure are usually a "hallmark" of private 
employment. The fact that the workshop environment resembles that 
of private employment was a useful rehabilitative and therapeutic de­
vice, . used to prepare the "clients" for private employment. 177 The 
Lighthouse has a production goal of eighty percent of the production 
of a sighted employee; however, only about sixty to sixty-five percent 
of its employees ever. produce above the sixty percent level. 178 
Although it was determined that an in-house counselor would aid the 
overall placement effort, it was not per se insufficient to simply comply 
with Department of Labor requirements. 
Further, in the past, the private sector has not been anxious to 
hire blind workers. 179 Before inferring an industrial motive upon such 
a basis, the handicaps involved should be considered. ISO The Board's 
172. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 181 (8th Cir. 1988). 
See infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Wagner-O'Day Act. 
173. Id. at 182-83. 
174. Id. at 182. 
175. Id. at 185. 
176. Id. at 182. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text for further discussion 
of these standards. 
177. Id. at 183-84. 
178. Id. at 183 n.3. 
179. Id. at 184. 
180. Id. at 185. 
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action and view would tend to discourage the formation and operation 
of non-profit projects to aid and assist therapeutic and rehabilitative 
efforts and the employment of the handicapped as promoted by the 
Wagner-O'Day Act. ISI 
Furthermore, due. to the nature of the workshop, the normal 
objectives of a labor union, although emphasized in a different man­
ner, are overtaken by the employer itself. If a union were established 
and demanded higher wages and/or better benefits, the employer 
might be forced to reduce the number of handicapped individuals it 
employs, employ more productive workers, or change employment 
policies in order to waylay harmful union demands. ls2 The ultimate 
goal of the workshop was to help the employees obtain skills and a 
sense of self-worth rather than financial gain. IS3 The court acknowl­
edged the fact that the other court of appeals' cases analyzing this 
issue agree with the Board's decision, thus creating a split in interpre­
tation by the federal court system. IS4 
The Arkansas Lighthouse court acknowledged other policies and 
legislation, such as the Wagner-O'Day Act, involving handicapped 
employees in sheltered workshops. Prior to the Arkansas Lighthouse 
decision, courts, such as the Houston Lighthouse court, neglected to 
address the legislative and policy issues relevant to these individuals. 
V. 	 ANALYSIS OF ARKANSAS LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND 
DECISION CONSIDERING POLICY AND PRIOR DECISIONS 
The NLRA defines the terms used in the Act very broadly. ISS 
Although the Board has been given broad discretion in interpreting 
these terms, the Board must still exercise this discretion within the 
constraints and limitations prescribed by Congress. IS6 The NLRA 
does not specifically exclude handicapped employees in sheltered 
181. [d. at 183. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for a further discus~ 
sion of the Wagner-O'Day Act. 
182. [d. at 183. 
183. Id. at 185. 
184. Id. at 184. 
185. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). "[T]he broad lan­
guage of the Act's definitions ... [of] 'employee,' 'employer,' and 'labor dispute,' leaves no 
doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly ...." [d. at 1 29-30. See supra notes 
4-7 and ~ccompanying text for a further discussion of the definitions and their. interpreta­
tion under the NLRA. 
186. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947). "It is inconceivable that 
Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to give every word in the act 
whatever meaning it wished .... Congress intended ... that the Board give to the words 
not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings." Id. See supra notes 4-8 and accompany­
ing text for a further discussion of the Board's discretion. . ' 
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workshops from the Board's jurisdiction, but does exclude other speci­
fied groups. 187 Congress previously expressed its intention to give the 
Board the full breadth of congressional power under the commerce 
clause. 188 Accordingly, courts also entrusted the Board with broad 
powers when interpreting and enforcing the Act. 189 In the Amend­
ments of 1947, Congress expressed the view that nonprofit charitable 
organizations, in general, would not fall within the Board's jurisdic­
tion because they did not affect commerce, but Congress did not spe­
cifically deny the Board's jurisdiction over such organizations. 19o If 
Congress intended to bar completely the Board from exercising juris­
diction in such situations, it would have amended the statute to indi­
cate that intention, as it did in other specific instances. 191 Congress' 
failure to amend the statute in this manner has left the Board to decide 
in which cases to exercise jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations. 
As discussed in the Catholic Bishops decision,192 the Board's standards 
may not constitute a workable guide for exercise of its jurisdiction. 193 
The Board has never outlined clear guidelines or standards to explain 
187. 29 U.S.c. § 152(3) (1982). See supra notes 4-5 & 55-56 and accompanying text 
for a further discussion of the definitions of "employee" and "employer" under the NLRA. 
188. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935). "In enacting the National 
Labor Relations Act, Congress gave and intended to give the Board the fullest possible 
jurisdiction under the commerce clause of the Constitution." NLRB v. Erlich's 814, Inc., 
577 F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1978). See also NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 
(1963); Polish Nat'\. Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944). See supra note 26 and ac­
companying text for a further discussion of Congress' power under the commerce clause. 
189. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Congress' power under the com­
merce clause is "broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no ex­
press constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court ... not to interfere." Id. at 
305. This power may be exerted to prevent the disruption of commerce. Id. See supra note 
26 ahd accompanying text for a further discussion of Congress' power under the commerce 
clause. 
190. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1947 U.S. 
CODE. CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1135, 1137. "The other nonprofit organizations ... are 
not specifically excluded in the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances 
and in connection with purely commercial activities ... [have they] been considered as 
affecting commerce so as to bring them within the scope of the National Labor Relations 
Act." Id. ,See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text for a further discussion of organi­
zati~ns exempt from the NLRA. 
191. 29 U.S.C. § 183 (1982). See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text for a 
discussion Of th~ health care industry provisions 'in the NLRA. 
192. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text for a further 
discussion of the Catholic Bishops decision. 
193. NLRB V. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 490. The Board's standard 
to establish its jurisdiction over religious schools entailed a determinatio'n of whether the 
school is'''completely religious" and not "merely religiously associated." Id. at 495. This 
standard "failed to provide a workable guide for the exercise of discretion." Id. See supra 
notes 42-43 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the Catholic Bishops 
decision. 
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the "typically industrial" or "rehabilitative" categories concerning 
sheltered workshops.194 The Arkansas Lighthouse 195 court did not 
deny the fact that the Board may, in certain circumstances, have juris­
diction over these types of employees; however, it questioned the 
Board's application of these broad guidelines in light of other legisla­
tive policies involving handicapped individuals. 196 The Arkansas 
Lighthouse court indicated that in the present case the Board took a 
much too restrictive view of "rehabilitative" workshops, thereby abus­
ing its discretion. 197 
The Arkansas Lighthouse court was concerned that the Board's 
exercise of jurisdiction in these situations tended to discourage the for­
mation and operation of sheltered workshops, undermining congres­
sional intention to protect and further the interests of the 
handicapped. 198 Unionization may force such organizations to change 
their operations significantly enough to defeat the purposes of these 
organizations and the congressional policies to provide and encourage 
employment for handicapped individuals. 199 
The legislation pertaining to handicapped individuals indicates 
some underlying policies which cannot be ignored. Congress enacted 
this legislation to encourage the hiring and retention of such individu­
194. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
standards. 
195. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988). 
196. See supra notes 59-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of other legisla­
tion involving handicapped individuals. 
197. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 182. "[T]he Board 
has taken a much too restrictive view of what constitutes rehabilitation or therapy." Id. 
"[T]he Board's exercise of jurisdiction resulted from an erroneous view of what constitutes 
rehabilitation." Id. at 183. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text for a further 
discussion of the Arkansas Lighthouse court's determination. 
198. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. "The Board's 
action and view of its majority adopts the opposite view of discouraging formation and 
operation of non-profit projects to aid and assist therapeutic and rehabilitative efforts to 
employ the handicapped." Id. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. See supra notes 
58-135 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislation enacted to address the 
problems and concerns of handicapped individuals. 
199. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. The court in 
discussing the Wagner-O'Day Act determined that "[t]he Board's action [of allowing 
unionization] and view of its majority adopts the opposite view of discouraging the forma­
tion and operation of non-profit projects to aid and assist therapeutic and rehabilitative 
efforts to employ the handicapped." Id. at 183. The court also acknowledged that "to 
permit collective bargaining in this context is to risk harmful intrusion on the rehabilitative 
process ... [and] is likely to distort the unique relationship between Employer and client 
and impair the Employer's ability to accomplish its salutory objectives." Id. (quoting 
Goodwill Industries of Southern California, 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537-38 (1977». See supra 
notes 155, 180, & 181 and accompanying text for a discussion of unionization in the envi­
ronment of a sheltered workshop. 
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als in an employment setting.2°O This legislation has resulted in con­
certed efforts to focus attention on the problems and needs of the 
handicapped and to vitalize the commitment of the United States to 
overcome these problems.20\ Programs and policies instituted through 
the Wagner-O'Day Act,202 the Fair Labor Standards Act,203 the Reha­
bilitative Act of 1973,204 and the Internal Revenue Code205 provide a 
basis for understanding congressional intent with respect to these indi­
viduals. Although handicapped individuals should be treated as pro­
200. H.R. REP. No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1079, 1093. The Wagner-O'Day Act is consistent with "the De­
partment [of Laborl's objective to promote employment of the handicapped." Id. Con­
gress hoped that the handicapped would "acquire sufficient job-skill proficiency to enter a 
competitive job situation." Id. The Fair Labor Standards Act allows for the operation of 
the sheltered workshop which is defined as a "charitable organization or institution con­
ducted not for profit, but for the purpose of carrying out a recognized program of rehabili­
tation ... or other occupational rehabilitating activity of an educational or therapeutic 
nature" for handicapped workers. 29 C.F.R. § 525.2(b) (1988). The Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 was designed, in part, "to focus research and training activities on making employ­
ment and participation in society more feasible for handicapped individuals." S. REP. No. 
318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 
2092. See supra notes 58-135 and accompanying text for a further discussion of legislation 
pertaining to handicapped individuals. 
201. S. REP. No. 1330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938). In enacting the Wagner­
O'Day Act, Congress recognized that the employment opportunities for the blind are lim­
ited, and; therefore, "the Government should spare no effort to aid and assist them by 
means other than relief grant." Id. The Fair Labor Standards Act was amended in 1966 
for the "purpose of improving the economic circumstances of handicapped workers, speed­
ing their movement into fully protective private employment, and assuring that such work­
ers are not exploited through low wages." S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3002, 3025. The Act was further 
amended to provide handicapped individuals with the "due process protection [that] is an 
essential element in the [Act] ... and will hopefully insure against exploitation of this 
vulnerable sector of our work force." 132 CONGo REC. H8825 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) 
(statements of Rep. Murphy). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 sought to "improve in every 
possible respect the lives as well as the livelihood of [handicapped] individuals served." S. 
REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 2076, 2079. The Act is intended to promote a "better program of service" and 
"designed to focus research and training activities on making employment and participa­
tion in society more feasible for handicapped individuals." Id. at 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2092. See supra notes 62-63,91-96, 107, & 114-18 and 
accompanying text for a further discussion of Congress' commitment to handicapped 
individuals. 
202. 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 (1982). See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for a 
further discussion of the Wagner-O'Day Act. 
203. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (1982). See supra notes 76-105 and accompanying text 
for a further discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
204. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982). See supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text 
for Ii further discussion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
205. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9501 (1982). See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text for 
a further discussion of the Internal Revenue Code. 
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ductive and worthwhile citizens, employers must be aware of limited 
capabilities due to their handicap(s). These congressional policies and 
intentions must be considered in situations involving the handicapped. 
Although it wished to encourage the handicapped to seek em­
ployment in private industry, Congress realized that this goal may not 
always be obtainable-depending on both the handicap and the indi­
vidual.206 Balancing the actual limitations of the handicapped against 
hopes of rehabilitation invokes the realization that the relationship be­
tween these individuals and present and potential employers must be 
dealt with carefully. In realizing the need to encourage employers to 
hire the handicapped, Congress requires the governqtent to purchase 
products made by the handicapped,207 gives such nonprofit charitable 
organizations hiring the handicapped tax exempt status,208 allows.em­
ployers of the handicapped to pay wages below minimum wage upon 
approval by the Secretary of Labor,209 and requires state and federal 
programs to address and oversee matters involving the handicapped, 
including provisions trying to eliminate discrimination against the 
handicapped.210 Through this type of legislation, Congress encour­
ages employment of the handicapped while also trying to curb abuse of 
flexibilities and incentives given to employers employing such individ­
uals. 211 Legislation has developed in response to these concerns. Con­
206. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2092. Congress wishes for the programs in the Rehabilitation Act to 
"remain vocationally oriented, it does believe that there are handicapped individuals whose 
handicaps are so severe, or because of other circumstances, such as age, that they may 
never achieve employment." Id. Congress strived to find methods so that "such individu­
als may gain entrance to the vocational rehabilitation program or may be enabled to live 
more independently." Id. at 2093. The Wagner-O'Day Act was expanded to "promote 
employment of the handicapped. Hopefully it will assist some of the severely handicapped 
to acquire sufficient job-skill proficiency to enter a competitive job situation." H.R. REP. 
No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
1079, 1093. See supra notes 64-66 & 114-18 and accompanying text for a further discussion 
of congressional policy. 
207. 41 U.S.c. §§ 46-48 (1982). See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text. 
208. 26 U.S.c. § 501 (1982). See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text. 
209. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-19 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 76-105 and ac­
companying text. 
210. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982). See supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text. 
211. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1620, 1665. Congress observed that "subminimum rates ... while com­
mendably flexible, also obviously permit ready abuse at the expense of the handicapped 
workers ...." Id. Representative Murphy indicated that, since Congress was "granting 
employers greater flexibility to manage their handicapped enterprises, it is absolutely essen­
tial that [Congress] preserve protections of the handicapped workers ...." 132 CONGo 
REC. H8825 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Murphy). Congress wished to 
"ensure against exploitation of this vulnerable sector of our work force." Id. See supra 
notes 86-96 and accompanying text. 
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gress has set up committees to investigate the social and economic 
situations confronting the handicapped,212 encouraged providing 
fringe benefits to these employees,213 allowed subminimum wages to be 
paid upon approval of the Secretary of Labor, and provided employees 
with a means to petition the Secretary of Labor for wage reviews.214 
The Arkansas Lighthouse court and Congress recognize that employ­
ers in private industry may not always be willing or able to hire the 
handicapped and that placement records from sheltered workshops 
may not be an accurate measure of the rehabilitative process.2lS 
Unlike the Arkansas Lighthouse court, the Houston Lighthouse 
court did not address the relevant policy and legislation considerations 
that concern handicapped individuals. The Houston Lighthouse court 
based its decision solely on whether the Board abused its discretion 
under the NLRA as indicated from inferences drawn from the factual 
situation.216 Despite the factual similarities between the Houston 
Lighthouse and the Arkansas Lighthouse, the two courts came to con­
flicting decisions concerning the discretion of the Board to assert juris­
diction over these employees.217 While the Houston Lighthouse court 
found, that the operations of the Lighthouse too closely paralleled 
212. 41 U.S.C. § 47(e) (1982). Congress created a committee to conduct "continuing 
study and evaluation of its activities ... for the purpose of assuming effective and efficient 
administration of [the Wagner-O'Day Act)." Id. See supra notes 68-72 & 119-221 and 
accompanying text. 
213. H.R. REP. No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1079, 1085. The House of Representatives indicated that there was "an­
other area of Congressional concern, namely the need to explore the relationship of the 
handicapped workers and their workshops to fringe benefits." Id. The House of Repre­
sentatives suggested that "studies of policies and practices of workshops with respect to 
[fringe benefits] should be undertaken." Id. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
214. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying 
text. 
215. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 184 (8th Cir. 1988). 
"Lighthouse's rehabilitative object is not undermined by its unspectacular placement rate. 
Experience indicates that the private sector is not very anxious to hire blind workers." Id. 
"[T]here are handicapped individuals whose handicaps are so severe, or because of other 
circumstances, such as age, that may never achieve employment." S. REP. No. 318, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2076,2092. See 
. supra notes 117 & 178 and accompanying text. 
216. NLRB V. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d 399, 406-07 (5th Cir. 
1983). "We can find no error in the Board's determination ...." Id. "The Board has 
determined that application of the Act to workers in workshops such as the Lighthouse ... 
is entirely consistent with the statutory purpose. We find that such a determination has a 
'reasonable basis in law.''' Id. at 407 (quoting NLRB V. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 
U.S. Ill, 131). See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. 
217. NLRB V. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 404; Arkansas 
Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 182. See supra notes 156 & 175 and accom­
panying text for a further discussion of the courts' decisions. 
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those found in private industry,218 the Arkansas Lighthouse court 
found these parallels to be good preparation for employment in private 
industry and useful in acclimating handicapped employees to private 
industry.219 The Arkansas Lighthouse court indicated that this type 
of environment is probably the most successful method of 
rehabilitation.220 
The Houston Lighthouse court did not address the policies and 
legislation relevant to sheltered workshops and handicapped employ­
ees, but simply deferred to the Board's discretion. 221 It ignored the 
unique situation of these individuals and the economic realities of 
workshops and their clients in the realm of private industry and em­
ployers. Although this decision is consistent with the Board's discre­
tion, it failed to address the relevant underlying issues,222 which 
include government purchases required by the Wagner-O'Day Act, 
wage provisions instated by the Fair Labor Standards Act, policies 
and programs underlying the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the tax 
exempt status of sheltered workshops provided by the Internal Reve­
nue Code. 
The Board seems to use inconsistent criteria in determining 
whether a specific sheltered workshop is within its jurisdiction. When 
the Board chooses not to assert jurisdiction, it focuses on its own view 
of the employer's objectives.223 In decisions where jurisdiction is as­
218. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 405-06. "These 
working conditions and this working environment are in dominant measure typical of 
working conditions and a working environment subject to collective bargaining. . . . The 
panoply of working conditions and benefits which the Lighthouse has paternalistically 
given to Workshop A are the normal and usual grist for the mill of collective bargaining." 
Id. at 406. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
219. Id. at 183. "There may be no better preparation for work in private industry 
than time spent in a caring environment which in some respects parallels private industry." 
Id. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
220. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. "Work is proba­
bly the most productive and successful method of rehabilitation for handicapped persons 
who are able to work, and particularly the blind." Id. 
221. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 404. See supra note 
156 and accompanying text. 
222. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 407. The court 
determined that the Board's application of the NLRA to such employees "is entirely con­
sistent with the statutory purpose." Id. The court found that "such a determination has a 
'reasonable basis in law.''' Id. Further, the court stated that "[t]here is no Congressional 
policy that collective bargaining is totally inconsistent with rehabilitative activity." Id. See 
supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the Houston Light­
house court's reasoning. 
223. See Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371 (1982) (the Board found that 
Key did not employ individuals expecting to benefit from their output). See also Goodwill 
Industries of Southern California, 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977) (the Board determined that 
385 1989] HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES 
serted, the Board has made sweeping conclusions concerning the un­
derlying economic motives of the employer.224 Consistency and 
predictability are lacking in these decisions, thereby failing to provide 
any substantial basis for future determinations. 
In determining whether handicapped employees in sheltered 
workshops come under the NLRA, the Board has exercised its discre­
tion in deciding if the Board has jurisdiction in a particular case. The 
courts have, for the most part, deferred to the Board's discretion, rec­
ognizing the broad definitions used in dictating jurisdiction under the 
NLRA.22S The Arkansas court expressed the need to go beyond the 
actual language of the NLRA and to consider other policies and con­
cerns involving handicapped employees in sheltered workshops.226 
The Arkansas court realized the problems in applying the "rehabilita­
tive" or "typically industrial" distinction applied by the Board to 
handicapped employees in sheltered workshops.227 Although the Ar­
kansas court addressed the issue, the language and legislative history 
of the NLRA precludes courts from determining that the Board may 
not exercise jurisdiction in these environments.228 
In examining the policy and history behind the NLRA, Congress 
created exemptions and special provisions in order to regulate the indi­
viduals that are within the exercise of the Board's jurisdictional power 
Goodwill's concern was for rehabilitating its clients and not for producing a product for 
profit). See supra notes 155 & 158-60 and accompanying text for a further discussion of 
these decisions. 
224. See Cincinnati Assoc. for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982) (the 
court determined that economic motives prevailed despite the therapeutic orientation). See 
also The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976) (the Board deter­
mined this employer, engaged in non-retail performance of services, derived a substantial 
part of money from private subcontracts, and, thus, it effectuated the policies of the Act to 
assert jurisdiction). See supra notes 136-42 & 153 for a further discussion of these 
decisions. 
225. Cincinnati Assoc. for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982). The 
Cincinnati court indicated that the "Board['s] discretion ... is subject to limited judicial 
review." Id. at 572. The court "decline[d] to disturb this exercise of the Board's discre­
tion." Id. at 573. 
The Houston Lighthouse court found "no error in the Board's determination." NLRB 
v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 1983). The court 
further found that "such a determination has a 'reasonable basis in law.''' Id. See supra 
notes 153, 156-57, & 215 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the 
Arkansas Lighthouse court's reasoning. 
227. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the 
Arkansas Lighthouse court's reasoning. 
228. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). See supra notes 16-56 and accompanying text for 
a further discussion of the NLRA, the Board's jurisdictional power, and the exemptions 
from the Board's jurisdiction. 
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and the extent to which that jurisdiction may be exercised.229 The 
Arkansas Lighthouse court correctly examined other factors, external 
to the NLRA, in determining that there isa strong public policy to 
encourage and protect employment of handicapped individuals in 
sheltered workshops.230 The court recognized the potential problems 
which may result from unregulated and uncontrolled unionization of 
handicapped employees in sheltered workshops.231 One of the pur­
poses behind the extensive legislation involving the handicapped is to 
encourage employment opportunities for handicapped individuals.232 
This purpose is furthered by offering incentives to potential employers 
to encourage the formation and operation of sheltered workshops em­
229. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). See also 29 U.S.C. § 183 (1982). See supra notes 4-8, 
42-43 & 46-56 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the individuals within the 
Board's jurisdictional power. 
230. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. The court stated 
that: 
Our society through its government recognizes ... [work as a successful method 
of rehabilitation] by aiding and assisting with the Wagner-O'Day Act .... The 
Wagner-O'Day Act assists projects aiding the handicapped by providing a ready 
market and purchase of the productive efforts engendered by the not-for-profit 
groups seeking to employ handicapped people. The Board's action and view of its 
majority adopts the opposite view of discouraging the formation and operation of 
non-profit projects to aid and assist therapeutic and rehabilitative efforts to em­
ploy the handicapped. 
Id. See supra notes 180 & 198 and accompanying text. 
231. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. "The usual 
employer-employee relationship in our competitive marketplace is not present in these good 
faith efforts to employ the handicapped nor is the Union's normal objective of securing 
improved working conditions for the employees either necessary or productive of that ob­
jective." Id. "'To permit collective bargaining in this context is to risk harmful intrusion 
on the rehabilitative process. . .. The collective bargaining process ... is likely to distort 
the unique relationship between Employer and client and impair the Employer's ability to 
accomplish its salutory objectives.''' Id. (quoting Goodwill Industries of Southern Cali­
fornia, 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537-38 (1977». See supra notes 155, 181, & 198 and accompany­
ing text. 
232. S. REP. No. 1330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938). Because limited employment 
opportunities are available to the blind, the Wagner-O'Day Act provided that "the Govern­
ment should spare no effort to aid and assist [the blind] by means other than relief grant." 
Id. The Fair Labor Standards Act has been amended for the purpose of "improving the 
economic circumstances of handicapped workers, speeding their movement into fully pro­
tective private employment, and assuring that such workers are not exploited through low 
wages." S. REP. No. 1487, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3002, 3025. One of the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is to 
"focus research and training activities on making employment and participation in society 
more feasible for handicapped individuals." S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 
reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2092. See supra notes 62-63, 
91-96, 107, 114-18 & 200 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Congress' 
commitment to handicapped individuals. 
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ploying handicapped individuals.233 
Although the Board does have the power to assert jurisdiction 
over handicapped employees in sheltered workshops,234 it may not be 
desirable to allow the unionization that may result. In accordance 
with the specific legislation and policies involved, handicapped indi­
viduals and their interests must be understood and represented suffi­
ciently in the bargaining process between the employer and the 
representative union. To allow unregulated negotiations between par­
ties with little understanding of the special place in society of the 
handicapped could be devastating for the parties involved. Handi­
capped individuals employed in sheltered workshops and sheltered 
workshops employing the handicapped as well as the handicapped 
population in general could be adversely affected. There is a strong 
public policy, indicated by legislation, to regulate and control the em­
ployment relationship.235 Although public interest demands that 
handicapped employees not be deprived of their statutory rights, it is 
necessary for parties involved to understand the special problems in­
volved and to mitigate the possible effects.236 The uniqueness of shel­
tered workshops along with the specific issues involving the 
handicapped dictates the need to have some regulation and control 
233. H.R. REP. No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1079, 1092-93. The Wagner-O'Day Act requires the government 
to purchase certain commodities from sheltered workshops in order to "promote employ­
ment of the handicapped." Id. Congress hoped that these measures would "assist some of 
the severely handicapped to acquire sufficient job-skill proficiency to enter a competitive job 
situation." [d. The Fair Labor Standards Act allows employers of handicapped employees 
to pay those employees a wage rate below minimum wage. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(I)(a) (1982 
& Supp. IV 1986). The Internal Revenue Code also provides tax exempt status for shel­
tered workshops. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1982). See supra notes 64-66,97-105,114-18,126­
29, & 205 for a further discussion of the expression of congressional intent to encourage the 
hiring of handicapped individuals. 
234. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). See supra notes 16-57 and accompanying text for a 
further discussion of the Board's jurisdiction over handicapped employees under the 
NLRA. 
235. 132 CONGo REC. H8825-8826 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Petri). 
Representative Petri observed that the special provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act 
"allow employment opportunities for handicapped persons who would not be able to com­
pete for jobs in the regular labor marketplace if the regular minimum wage had to be paid." 
[d. See supra notes 91-96,99-104, & 117-19 and accompanying text. 
236. 41 U.S.c. § 47 (1982). "The Committee [for Purchase from the Blind and 
Other Severely Handicapped] shall make a continuing study and evaluation of its activities 
... for the purpose of assuring effective and efficient administration of the [Wagner-O'Day] 
Act." [d. These studies and evaluations address problems of employment of the handi­
capped and greater utilization of the handicapped. [d. See supra notes 53-54 and accompa­
nying text for a further discussion of the health care industry provisions. 
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over the employment relationship.237 
CONCLUSION 
The National Labor Relations Board has been gIven broad 
enough discretion to exercise jurisdiction over handicapped employees 
in sheltered workshops. They have exercised this jurisdiction by es­
tablishing broad categories for determining whether certain organiza­
tions fall under the Act. The Arkansas Lighthouse court is the first 
court of appeals to question the distinctions made by the Bo~rd in 
determining when to assert jurisdiction. The Arkansas Lighthouse 
court takes a view of handicapped individuals, not only as they fall 
within the Act, but also in light of other legislation aimed at providing 
and extending employment opportunities for the handicapped. The 
analysis of the Arkansas Lighthouse court seems to be a realistic posi­
tion in response to legislative, economic, and social policies. 
Catherine A. Bean 
237. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the underlying 
policies in enacting the health care provision of the NLRA. 
